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The misleading and propagandistic tendencies in American news reporting have
been a part of public discussion from its earliest days as a republic (Innis, 2007;
Sheppard, 2007). “Fake news” is hardly new (McKernon, 1925), and the term has been
applied to a variety of distinct phenomenon ranging from satire to news, which one may
find disagreeable (Jankowski, 2018; Tandoc et al., 2018). However, this problem has
become increasingly acute in recent years with the Macquarie Dictionary declaring “fake
news” the word of the year in 2016 (Lavoipierre, 2017). The international recognition of
fake news as a problem (Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014; Applebaum and Lucas, 2016)
has led to a number of initiatives to mitigate perceived causes, with varying levels
of success (Flanagin and Metzger, 2014; Horne and Adali, 2017; Sample et al., 2018).
The inability to create a holistic solution continues to stymie researchers and vested
parties. A significant contributor to the problem is the interdisciplinary nature of digital
deception. While technology enables the rapid and wide dissemination of digitally
deceptive data, the design and consumption of data rely on a mixture of psychology,
sociology, political science, economics, linguistics, marketing, and fine arts. The authors
for this effort discuss deception’s history, both old and new, from an interdisciplinary
viewpoint and then proceed to discuss how various disciplines contribute to aiding
in the detection and countering of fake news narratives. A discussion of various fake
news types (printed, staged events, altered photographs, and deep fakes) ensues
with the various technologies being used to identify these; the shortcomings of those
technologies and finally the insights offered by the other disciplines can be incorporated
to improve outcomes. A three-point evaluation model that focuses on contextual data
evaluation, pattern spread, and archival analysis of both the author and publication
archives is introduced. While the model put forth cannot determine fact from fiction,
the ability to measure distance from fact across various domains provides a starting
point for evaluating the veracity of a new story.
Keywords: fake news, discipline, behaviors, values, rhetoric, politics, deception
“If it is not true, it is very well invented.” —Giordano Bruno
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INTRODUCTION
Fake news has a long history in America (McKernon, 1925;
Innis, 2007), becoming internationally recognized as a
problem in 2016, the year it was declared word of the
year by Macquarie Dictionary (Lavoipierre, 2017). The re-
emergence of the term “fake news” (Meza, 2017) served as
an inflection point for academics across various disciplines.
Some academics observed the commonalities between
“fake news” and propaganda that uses a different delivery
mechanism (Younger, 2018), whereas others observed greater
sophistication, customization, and weaponization (Younger,
2018; Verrall and Mason, 2019). Those in academia and
government who recognized this threat, some as early
as Szfranski (1997), others soon after (Cybenko et al.,
2002). Szfranski (1997) suggested that the weaponization
of deceptive information would require protection of
both combatants and non-combatants alike. While some
groups of people are more resilient against deceptive
data (Bjola and Papadakis, 2020) suggesting a cultural
component, significant populations remain vulnerable.
The vulnerable also includes journalists, who repeat the
stories that align with their own values. Even the journalists’
verification and validation mechanisms are corrupted by
algorithms that provide information that aligns with targeted
beliefs. Indeed, according to some behavioral scientists,
all are vulnerable to the messages that confirm biases
(Oswald and Grosjean, 2004).
Media spheres such as journalism require their journalists
to act as watchdogs of information-sharing for its global
citizens. Their position in the world holds responsibility to
provide independent truth and legitimacy to its audience
by providing fact-checking. General verification procedures
will be covered to transition into discussion about the
importance of interdisciplinary work. Journalists intercept
deception by reporting on the truth of our reality,
having a general agreed normative approach to fact-
checking including combating fake news narratives even
if interpreting false claims is still very much subjective
(Graves, 2018; Mena, 2019). Five elements of fact checking
provided by Bratich (2020) include choosing claims
to check, contacting the source of the claim, tracing
false claims, working with experts, and showing their
(journalists) work. Within this frame, journalism has
become loaded with uncertainty, mistrust, and manipulation
from its user engagement and many other trends, such
as politics and emerging technologies, which intersect it
(Waisbord, 2018).
Pomerantsev and Weiss (2014) identified five
goals of disinformation, of which fake news is a
subset, these goals include paralysis, demoralization,
confusion, blackmail, and subversion. Disinformation
campaigns will seek any and all of these goals each
of the five goals represents a strategy to use against
a targeted group of people. For example, credible
news stories that report opposite stories on the same
event can, if both are professionally done, confuse
a person who is new to the story and environment,
rather than simply sway the person to one side
or another.
Fake News, Disinformation, and
Manipulation
The use of disinformation and misinformation in news has a
long history. Some scholars have focused on misinformation,
the inadvertent release of misleading or factually incorrect
information, or disinformation, involving the intentional
diffusion of factually incorrect claims for political purposes
(Bakir and McStay, 2018; Bennett and Livingston, 2018). From
a perspective of information warfare, however, claims need not
be false to have strategic value in manipulating an audience
(Schafer, 2018). Well-timed, factually correct information can be
as effective as a lie; when this occurs, the information becomes
weaponized. This section develops the distinction between
information and its weaponization as the movement from an
information logic to an identity logic within communications.
Information is classically defined as “current data about
developments in and the status of” a system at any given
time (Downs, 1957, p. 79). An information logic has three
components. First, there is a temporal dimension. As information
refers to the current status of a system or scene of events,
it has a fleeting duration, “information that is repeated is no
longer information. It retains its meaning in the repetition but
loses its value as information” because it no longer updates
one’s understanding of a state of affairs (Luhmann, 1995, p. 67;
Lash, 2002). The same materials may resurface repeatedly,
but this defines an extended present that sublimates past and
future and is no longer operating in an informational mode
(Rushkoff, 2013).
Second, the contextualized component includes the scene or
situation in which activity takes place. Contextualized data are
bound to the environment where created or resides. In this sense,
data, particularly digital data, when taken out of context, perturb
the environment, and traces from the perturbation will remain.
Information has a third characteristic: information
descriptive, rather than moralizing or hortatory, does not
call for action (Burke, 1969, p. 41). Thus, information contrasts
with emotionally polarizing communication content. Whereas
the experience of sensory data may provide an updated status
about local states of affairs, emotions “do not give us any
information about the world” (Wittgenstein, 1967, p. 491).
Both misinformation and disinformation point to
informational disorders, an enduring aspect of the Downsean
tradition within political science. Accurate information about
states of affairs within a political system has remained a critical
currency, often in too short supply, which citizens require to
make informed democratic choices (Converse, 1962; Grofman,
1995; Delli et al., 1997; McGann, 2006). Fake news is often
taken as a species of disinformation as it is both a fabrication and
“mimics news media content in form but not in process or intent”
(Lazer, 2018, p. 1094). From this perspective, misinformation
and disinformation are distorting as these phenomena provide
errant premises on which to make decisions in light of pregiven
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preferences (Hochschild and Katherine, 2015; Mathiesen, 2018).
And, while deception might be a short-term strategy for elected
officials, if they seek reelection, there can be costs to deception
during elections (Ferejohn, 1990, p. 10). More recently, the
rise of polarized electorates makes possible the continuation of
informational disorders.
Preparing for Fake News
Deception is not limited to the political realm. Health/medicine
(Springer, 2020), finance (Cybenko et al., 2002), the military,
and cyber domains are a few of the other environments where
deceptive data or fake news have successfully been deployed.
Deception relies on tricking both sensation and perception. In
order for information to be perceived the data must first be
sensed. Human perception and information processing are still
not fully understood (De Faveri et al., 2017).
“Persuasion lies at the heart of political communications”
(Flanagin and Metzger, 2014, p. 1). In order for fake news to be
effective, the deception must first be formed then communicated.
The communication process where sender and receiver share
the same perception of information was defined by Gerbner
(1956). Gerbner’s model of communications identifies the role of
perception and contextualization in the message creation phase.
Successful deception relies on influencing the thinking of the
target (De Faveri et al., 2017). The target in the case of fake news is
the human mind, and journalists are humans and thus vulnerable
to disinformation.
Because the target is the human mind, a brief discussion
on factors that feed into decision-making is relevant. Before
information processing can occur, the data that form the
information must first be sensed and then perceived. Sensing
occurs when one or more of the five senses are stimulated.
Generally speaking, sight and sound predominate in sensory
stimulation particularly, so in the online world where fake news
prevails, sensory deprivation makes possible the ability to control
perception. Perception provides the input into decision-making,
so a lack of stimuli (sensation data) or manipulated sensation
data designed as context triggers the initial unconscious, neural
response for specific actions (Gazzaniga, 2014). Conversely, an
un-sensed event is never perceived or a non-event.
While much focus on decision-making centers on motivation,
the authors would be remiss if they did not list additional factors.
Decisions rely on several factors that in addition to motivation
include patience/impatience, risk attitude, and ambiguity attitude
(Gazzaniga, 2014). These different factors suggest that the
manner in which decisions are made is diverse. Any single
factor or combination of factors and predicting which factors
dominate in any decision are most accurate as a post hoc exercise.
Furthermore, all factors discussed in the decision-making process
are situationally dependent.
Decisions can be broken down into two types: conscious,
otherwise known as action–outcome decisions, and unconscious,
also referred to as stimulus–response (Dijksterhuis, 2004;
Kahneman, 2011; Gazzaniga, 2014). Both types of decisions are
influenced by biases. De Faveri et al. (2017) described patterned
deviations from fact in perception as biases and heuristics—
cognitive shortcuts (McAlaney and Benson, 2020). Regardless
of the type of decision being made, the biases still influence.
However, the message creation can vary.
De Faveri et al. (2017) examined deception in the hostile cyber
environment and described three groups of biases: personal and
cultural, organizational, and cognitive. It was noted that while
highly effective, biases are difficult to obtain (ibid). However, this
observation preceded widespread knowledge of the role of social
media in fake news targeting and dissemination (Shu et al., 2017
several sources).
The new role of social media in content creation, delivery,
and dissemination of fake news has changed the landscape
in unanticipated ways, requiring a reexamination of ways to
identify and ultimately mitigate this type of deception. For
this reason, the authors are examining some of the common
disciplines involved in fake news or digital deception within the
model describing content, distribution, and archives defined by
Sample et al. (2018).
Deception as a Strategy
The assumption and assertion of a paper such as this are
the role of fake news as a means to achieve political, social,
and potentially other forms of influence utilizing deception as
a strategy. Deception as strategy has roots in ancient human
behavior, observed in the earliest histories including Greek
mythology (Phaedrus, 2008, p. 438). In more recent times,
Erfurth’s treatise on Surprise (Erfurth, 1943) provides a number
of helpful insights. He observes that almost all decisive military
victories have been preceded by surprise, which relies on secrecy
and speed. Deception is a form of surprise, providing a means
to unbalance an opponent through uncertainty. Handel’s detailed
analysis of deception at the strategic and operational levels in
World War II also offers key observations. Deception must
be believable to the target audience, with sufficient resources
and time invested in a coherent narrative to reinforce existing
beliefs: “The susceptibility to conditioning is one of the most
fundamental human proclivities to be exploited by deception
operations” (Handel, 1987, p. 14). Conditioning greatly precedes
the actual event of deception. Conditioning lays the groundwork
upon which the deception capitalizes.
Disinformation, a critical form of and enabler of deception,
has a history in both warfare and state security functions.
The use of disinformation as a form of deception is examined
by Whaley (2007, p. 8), in the historical context that it was
originally a World War I term applied by the German General
Staff and then adopted by the Russians. Applying Shannon’s
communication model, relevant but false information is fed
into a communication channel, forming a third transmission
category to signal and noise. This third category described
by Whaley (ibid) may be disinformation or misinformation
depending on intent. Misinformation is inadvertent, whereas
disinformation deliberately seeks to overload, discredit, or realign
an audience’s information management capabilities. Given the
requirement to consider intent, disinformation has little utility
without a purpose. Having understood the target and obtaining
a means to access information and information networks
and then subsequently exploiting those networks to expand
access, disinformation provides the means to utilize supporting
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conditioned biases and narratives with the intent to influence
perceptions and behaviors (Waltz, 2008, p. 4).
The Soviet concept of maskirovka probably best encapsulates
the complexity of the problem space surrounding deception.
Although the term maskirovka can be defined as camouflage,
it extends in Soviet doctrine across a broad array of strategic,
operational, and tactical measures to obscure intent, maintain
security, and confuse the adversary (Glantz, 2006, p. 2). While
there are numerous instances of these maskirovka strategies
being successfully employed throughout World War II, which
have helped inform modern doctrines and techniques, it is also
important to note that failures have occurred when maskirovka
was employed hastily, poorly coordinated, enacted by personnel
with inadequate training (ibid, p. 14), or conducted in a
stereotyped or patterned manner (ibid, p. 10).
A critical observation of the maskirovka concept is the
employment of a variety of techniques at all levels, in a
planned and coordinated manner that also sought to embrace
complexity with significant focus on aligning tactical outcomes
with strategic intent. This appears to be a commonality with
today’s use of fake news. The employment of various tactical and
operational approaches to achieve a broad strategic intent allows
for multiple target audiences to be engaged with sometimes
conflicting narratives and thematic episodes. This tactical and
operational flexibility could be regarded as dangerous and
counterintuitive from the strategic perspective, but it provides
freedom of maneuver across the information environment
and the ability to leverage the complexity of the modern
information environment to achieve specific outcomes efficiently
and with speed. The ability to roam widely, engaging with
numerous audiences, themes, and narratives, at speed, appears
to be a force multiplier in the employment of disinformation
and fake news through social media and online forums.
Moreover, this approach capitalizes on a number of perceived
failures by trusted agencies to apply their moral and ethical
narratives consistently, meaning that conflicting narratives by
fake news agencies can always be excused by way of pointing
to inconsistencies by previously trusted establishments who have
perceived conflicts of interest, often amplified by the same
fake news outlets.
The identification of target variables and ability to fashion-
specific messages at an individual level, refined based on their
personal and cultural data, appear to support the contention
that a single, cohesive narrative is not required in the modern
world. Fake news agents, marketers, and political organizations
are able to target specific individuals based on individual
data collected from internet fingerprinting and social media.
This target variable data can distinguish at an individual level
likely biases, beliefs, and likely actions through personality
profiles. The more traditional media, government, and military
refer to target audiences in a different, less precise manner,
based on broad narratives and a focus on broad beliefs and
groupings with an assumption that these descriptions will lead
to specific group behaviors. It appears from these differences
and the rapid evolution of these technologies that disinformation
campaigns have a distinct advantage in the modern information
environment. In the instance where one can focus on the
issues specific to each individual and fashion the message to
alter behavior around those issues at a personal and granular
level, it appears that the narrative can be delivered in a micro,
targeted manner. The alternative appears to be the delivery of
grand narratives and themes supported by “trusted” agencies
that rely on their self-perception of impartiality, which is quickly
a target for fake news agencies and those who are likely to
benefit from distrust of alternatives to the fake news narratives. It
remains to be seen if the employment of fact checking, controlled
narratives, and traditional information operations approaches is
sufficient for the information environment of the future, but
the results to date are not particularly positive. Perhaps part of
the problem is the inconsistency inherent in modern life—it is
not inconceivable to act contrary to one’s beliefs based on more
personal, pertinent matters, which are fleeting. That is a matter
priests, theologians, and ethicists have grappled with since the
dawn of organized religion. Personality and culture, discussed
later within this article, are factors that are likely to contribute
to these outcomes.
The modern context of disinformation as applicable to fake
news extends from the fundamental concepts of deception as a
strategy and some of the principles discussed above. Susceptibility
to conditioning, bias, narrative, and the exploitation of
information and social networks are all fundamental to the
concept of fake news. These concepts will be discussed in more
detail throughout this article.
BACKGROUND
The weaponization of information is enhanced in the digital
world where communities are created not only through
borders and national boundaries, but also by shared thoughts
that include shared hopes and fears (Bennett, 2012). In the
information age where decision-making, especially in Western-
style democracies, carries great importance, the ability to control
sensing and manipulate perception in online communities is
extremely valuable.
If war is political, and politics inhibits a variety of attributes of
war, modern politics is in many ways invested in the preparation
for war, and our existing politics may even stem from and
reproduce a set of relationships established through war (Virilio
and Sylvère, 2008). The existence of nuclear deterrence as a
variation of the “stability-instability paradox” may incentivize
subkinetic forms of warfare, which can be harder to deter
precisely because efforts to restore deterrence conventionally
can risk nuclear escalation (Gartzke and Lindsay, 2019, p. 14).
Clausewitz (1982) termed war as politics by other means.
However, it is equally possible in the modern context of
hybrid war, political warfare, gray-zone conflict, and the like;
politics may be a continuation of warfare by other means
(Foucault, 2003).
Information warfare weaponizes communications in order to
effect change in a target audience in terms of their attitudes and
behaviors. If content is the currency of propaganda, then timing
performs a similar function for information weaponization.
The strategic communication of information can be a “source
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multiplier” shaping one’s understanding of situations, as well
as shaping “the operational environment” so as to neutralize
an adversary, as well as advance one’s own strategic objectives
(Armistead, 2004, p. 1). While information warfare retains the
descriptor “information,” it denotes a field of communication that
is transformative more than informative. Information operations
achieve these ends by seeking to “influence, disrupt, corrupt,
or usurp the decision making of adversaries” while protecting
those capacities for one’s own side. Because decision making is
largely biased, and biases are behavioral in nature, the shaping of
attitudes and beliefs is key to success in this environment.
Although information warfare has often been conceptually
confined to a space of military warfare, there is growing
recognition that it “can take place in any situation across the
spectrum of war or peace” (Morgan and Thompson, 2018, p. 10)
whereby warfare extends into political life in a non-kinetic, non–
physically violent form (Singer and Brooking, 2018, sec. Kindle:
325). This new type of warfare has been referred to as hybrid
warfare (Commin and Filiol, 2013) and enacted in numerous
countries (Atkinson, 2018), where fake news as a weapon of
information warfare plays a prominent role (Younger, 2018).
Politics have become a problematic center in fake news
reporting; journalists are criticized for being non-partisan during
fact-checking procedures coupled by general misunderstandings
that they are responsible for fact-checking future statements
from politicians, leading to increased user distrust in mainstream
media (Uscinski, 2015). These trends have caused a shift in
the traditional hierarchical information sphere on how truth
is reported, and interdisciplinary work has the opportunity to
address some of these issues. Social media has transformed
the landscape of information reporting, meaning that solutions
to combat fake news depend on the flexibility of traditional
journalistic pathways to produce fact-checking frameworks clear
enough to account for such change. Much like cybersecurity
issues faced today, the information flow of fake news is
unprecedented and at times overwhelming; mounting pressures
on journalists to discern truths has allowed for both increased
verification and vulnerabilities to occur in reporting. For
example, fact-checking the credibility of sources is a common
task, but there are many examples in mainstream media
where this is not the case, and many journalists recognize the
presence of this information disorder (Plotkina et al., 2020).
Information excess from virtual space produces a reporting
experience that can cause fact-checking to be synonymous
with instantaneous discernment of sources to then act, or
not act, upon. Generally, journalists do agree that taking
the time to do fact-checking thoroughly is more important
than being the first to cover a story, but this is not always
a tangible result (Schapals, 2018). Journalism, unlike many
other spheres, have an advantage in its ability to report
on evolving fake news concepts at the rate fake news
articles are being produced because of its unique access to
information streams.
There is an alternative view that modern information
operations occur in a globally competitive environment,
influenced by the integrated nature of the world trade and
political systems. World war is unlikely due the looming
threat of nuclear conflict, so instead political objectives are
achieved through kinetic and non-kinetic proxy wars. Cyber and
information are just some of the domains and environments
where this competition plays out. Even from a warfighting
perspective, in many cases the actual implementation of
information operations as a component of military campaigning
is focused on managing kinetic events against a narrative and
coordinating non-kinetic effects to achieve specified outcomes.
Therefore, the concept of information warfare can portray
a more integrated and planned approach than is often the
case. In reality, governments and societies, even totalitarian
ones, must balance a variety of internal and external forces
to shape their strategic objectives and narratives. For the
purposes of this article, however, we will refer to information
warfare in the context of ideologically and politically driven
fake news, which seeks to manipulate, deceive, and change
behavioral outcomes through disinformation for long-term
strategic advantage.
While some aspects of campaigning fit within an
informational economy, others bear a closer resemblance
to the strategies and tactics of information warfare. Information
by itself just informs an audience about the current state of affairs,
leaving the parameters of decisions unchanged. Information
becomes weaponized at the point that it shifts a target audience
by either reshaping the environment or the preferences, attitudes,
and even identities of the target audience in order to produce
judgments, decisions, and behaviors favorable to the initiator
(Marcellino et al., 2017, p. 9). This can be subtle. For example,
rather than changing a person’s desire to vote for a particular
party, it is enough to simply convince someone not to vote on
the day of the election. Value sets and beliefs are not always the
target. Sometimes it is enough just to influence behavior for a
short period to achieve the desired outcome.
The purpose of news is to inform the target audience
which differs from the weaponization of information that
seeks to deceive or manipulate through transformation of one’s
perception of a situation or through transformation of self-
identity. This ties information operations to the rhetorical
functions of communications of communication as information
leaves things as they are, while rhetoric works on its
subjects by influencing their identification with situations
and their understanding of self-identity. The realignment of
interests, attitudes, and beliefs through communications creates
a “consubstantiality” between persons such that they come to see
themselves as the same, at least within a certain set of parameters
for acting (Burke, 1969, p. 21). Underlying the creation of
consubstantiality involves shifting identifications with political
objects and actors, as well as their understandings of themselves
in relation to the political world. Identities are always relational,
demarcating what one is and, simultaneously, what one is not
(Connolly, 2002). Information warfare, therefore, involves the
strategic and tactical use of information, which operates on the
order of identities, shifting the alignments of a target from one
set of political identifications to another, with the ultimate goal of
shaping behavioral outcomes.
The focus on shaping identities and behavior is not limited
to warfare between international adversaries. In contrast to
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the informational terrain of political conflict, which has
informed models of spatial competition and political opinion
formation, political preferences are not prior to campaigning
but shaped by political identities, which are constructed through
campaigning over time. Evidence points to the primacy of
a politicized identity over information cues in understanding
American political behavior. Political identity is irreducible
to differences in issue positions as research shows policy
positions even on fundamental issues such as abortion shift
in line with partisan identities over time (Achen and Bartels,
2016; Mason, 2018). And while personality characteristics
of candidates might be one calculation along with policy
considerations, the explanation for political behavior predicated
on the basis of an identity logic is quite distinct from the
informational logic of policy preferences as policy preferences
are derivative of partisan identifications rather than the other
way around.1
An identity logic contrasts along all three dimensions of the
informational logic. First, in terms of the target of definition,
identities define actors rather than inform as to state of a situation
in which action occurs. Personal identities are composed of
“the commitments and identifications which provide the frame
or horizon within which I can determine. . . what is good, or
what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose” (Taylor,
1992, p. 27). The normative entailments of identities function
in communications as an “inducement to action (or an attitude,
attitude being an incipient act)” (Burke, 1969, p. 42).
Second, information and identity logics are temporally
distinct. By overlooking the unique timestamps, deep fakes,
computer-generated fake news, can work in deceiving targeted
users. In contrast to the instantaneous and fleeting nature of
information, identities temporally integrate an actor providing a
sense of continuity over time and space (Miskimmon et al., 2014,
p. 5). The repetition of identity claims perpetuates an identity
narrative that preserves a sense of ontological security in the face
of changing circumstances over time (Giddens, 1991, pp. 53–54).
On the other hand, identities can be weaponized at the point that
ontological security is put in jeopardy through communications
that undermine one’s trust in political actors and institutions or
one’s standing in the political system.
Third, in contrast to the descriptive nature of information,
the moral horizons that define identities provides a language
“for objects contain[ing] the emotional overtones which give us
the cues as to how to act toward those objects” (Burke, 1984,
p. 177). In online communications, “identity can be a shared
feeling” as “people recognize themselves in the emotions of
others” (Zaharna, 2018, p. 60). The contrasts to emotional appeals
are descriptions of external objects and events without reference
to the experience of those objects and events.2 Emotional
appeals can problematize identities as in the case of repeated
communications seeking to induce anger or fear can give rise
to anxieties—a tactic used by the Russian social media efforts to
1This is not to say that identity-based logics cannot be subject to spatial modeling
(see Glazer, 1995).
2This is not to invoke a strong subject–object distinction denoting the object of
description need not define the content and sources of subjects.
move Americans to deidentify with the existing political order
(Jensen, 2018).
Fake News: Content Creation, Delivery,
and Dissemination
Effective content creation relies on several different disciplines
from target selection (military, political science, biology,
psychology, and sociology) in service of creating memorable
content. The content must resonate with the intended target,
especially in an information-rich society. For this reason,
a discussion of linguistics, psychology, and sociology is
necessary. The delivery must be credible relying on psychology,
sociology, linguistics, theater, and more recently data science.
Dissemination often relies on technology, thereby introducing
cybersecurity into the mix.
Linguistics: Analysis of Propaganda Tools
Linguistics is a discipline that is used in creation of deceptive
data via rhetoric, but linguists are not consulted when countering
efforts are necessary. Sample et al. (2018) cited the three well-
known general attack types (ethos, pathos, and logos) as methods
associated with supporting fake news and why these methods
must be considered in any fake news countering solution.
Of the three rhetorical groupings, each presents challenges as
well as opportunities for automated processing by combining
rules of linguistics and computer science when deploying
computational linguistics.
The linguistic analysis of fake news must operate across a
range of domains and disciplines, for every act of language is
embedded in a context composed of a wide number of different
influences and drivers (political, social, cultural, ideological. . .
as well as the purely language-based). A study based on
the identification of lexical and syntactic patterning as an
identification and attribution tool (Conroy et al., 2015; Dey,
2018) can only be one step in the analysis. Similarly, a rhetorical
analysis, detecting both individual figures of speech and appeals
to ethos, logos, and pathos (see below), is vital, but can only be
a single element in a much broader and deeper examination of
the target texts. This article outlines a multidisciplinary approach
for the identification and countering of fake news in general;
we can also see how a blended, multidisciplinary methodology
can operate at the linguistic and communicative levels. A helpful
overview of one such blended approach is given by Zhou and
Zafarani (2018), but in what follows, an outline model for the
investigation of fake news is presented, based on analyzing it
not as single acts of language, but as a process of targeted
communication, consisting of several elements, all of which must
be considered to permit a truly informed understanding of how
fake news is constructed, and how it functions.
The following analytical schema is based on the seminal
model of communication outlined by Shannon (1948), in which
any communicative act is viewed as a process consisting of a
message transmitted from a sender to a receiver via a channel
(this is, of course, a simplification of the Shannon–Weaver model,
but it is a useful starting point). The key thing to note here
is that while we can study each element in isolation, a truly
sophisticated analysis will consider how the various components
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interact and interrelate. For example, consider the issue of the
chosen channel of transmission; different social media platforms
operate in different ways (Twitter has restrictions of message
length; Snapchat and Instagram are image-driven) and appeal to
different demographics (Chen, 2020). Just as fake news must be
carefully crafted to reach and appeal to specific target audiences,
so any effective countering-strategy must consider the most
appropriate communicative approaches and channels to mitigate
against it. We know that there is a correlation between age of
online users (and their political opinions) and their likelihood
to retransmit fake news (Guess et al., 2019); work remains to be
done on determining not just why this group is likely to fall prey
to fake news, but in devising strategies for mitigating against this.
In order to conduct an effective analysis of fake news, we
need to adopt the tools of corpus linguistics and establish a
robust database (or corpus) of previous fake news campaigns.
The examples cited in Tenove et al. (2018) and the two reports
from the United Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office.
(2018a,b) provide a helpful starting point. This will permit
the creation of a detailed taxonomy of fake news, looking at
sender/receiver/channel and allowing a detailed analysis of types
of message and their specific linguistic/rhetorical features. While
work has already been done in this field (Digital Shadows, 2018;
Molina et al., 2019), there is a pressing need for a much larger set
of corpora, which will permit a fine-grained analysis.
The final area for future research is that of traffic and social
network analysis; in order to truly understand how fake news
functions, we need to examine the ways in which stories spread
across a platform, and how various users, such as trolls, bots,
and super users, act as prolific spreaders of misinformation. The
development of tools for collecting, analyzing, and visualizing
message spread over time is a priority. The issue of timescale
is vital; we need to consider, for example, what factors drive
a particular item of fake news to disseminate rapidly across
information space, while counter-messages often lag far behind
and over a much smaller area. One tool that offers a useful basis
for R&D across the entire domain of social media platforms is
FireAnt, a piece of open-source software devised by Lawrence
Anthony and Claire Hardaker (Anthony, 2018), and another
freely available tool is the OSoMe tool developed at Indiana
University (OSoMe.). This allows the capturing of data from
Twitter over a set timescale; the data can then be visualized as
a social network map, permitting the identification of key nodes
of transmission. This in turn allows a fine-grained analysis of
message spread and the possibility of targeting any countering-
strategy toward the most prolific transmitters. The challenge will
be to devise tools that can operate across the whole range of social
media platforms (the image-driven, multimedia-rich domains of
Instagram and Snapchat will be particularly testing).
Ethos: define a person or group
“Persuasion lies at the heart of political communication”
(Flanagin and Metzger, 2014, p. 1); thus, the role of the messenger
is highly relevant. For this reason, the messengers are targeted,
as mentioned above. Gu et al. (2017) observed that the cost to
discredit a reporter was $50,000. Flanagin and Metzger (2014)
noted the role of credibility in presentation, as well as perceptions
of honesty and fairness, even when the message remained
constant. Ethos applied to the messenger will be further discussed
in the archival data subsection of this article.
Ethos defines the target or messenger (Cockcroft and
Cockcroft, 2005, pp. 28–54). The definitions for this activity can
be positive or negative. In some cases, popular personalities or
celebrities endorse politicians or politics (Scott, 2006) or cures,
and in other cases, negative nicknames are used to both of these
topics associated with a considerable amount of fake news. In
some cases, trusted reporters are targeted in an effort to damage
their credibility. A second type of ethos involves the messenger
and will be further discussed in the archive section. Attacking
the messenger can take the form of discrediting a reporter, a
publisher, an editor, or any other entity in the news supply chain.
Fake news will inevitably build on the
ideological/cultural/political values of the intended audience, or
it will fail. Not only must it “speak the audience’s language,” as
it were, but it must also operate within the frame of reference
held by that audience. In so doing, the “us” against “them”
narrative that is commonly deployed can take hold adding an
emotional tie-in. This emotional tie-in is further discussed in the
pathos subsection.
When ethos is deployed, the good–bad dichotomy prevails,
even though most individuals have both good and bad personality
traits, nicknames suggesting malevolence or benevolence with
the target but not both. The use of ethos appeals to tribal
identification and behaviors. Thus, this form of propaganda can
be used with better efficacy on homogeneous groups in societies
where fear of new or other groups predominates over curiosity
or hope (Hofstede et al., 2010). In these societies, “in groups” are
viewed as having significantly different values than “out groups.”
Pathos: appeal to emotion
This rhetorical grouping is characterized by the appeal to
emotions; thus, the emotions of fear (Montgomery, 2017) and
hope (Menz, 2009) have a long-documented history of use in
the political arena. Emotions play a critical role in political
propaganda. In contrast to the descriptive nature of information,
the moral horizons that define identities provide a language
“for objects contain[ing] the emotional overtones, which give us
the cues as to how to act toward those objects” (Burke, 1984,
p. 177). In online communications, “identity can be a shared
feeling” as “people recognize themselves in the emotions of
others” (Zaharna, 2018, p. 60). The contrasts to emotional appeals
are descriptions of external objects and events without reference
to the experience of those objects and events.3 Emotional appeals
can problematize identities just as in the case of repeated
communications seeking to induce anger or fear can give rise
to anxieties—a tactic used by the Russian social media efforts
to move Americans to deidentify with the existing political
order (Jensen, 2018). Fear and hope have also been used in as
motivators in military matters.
Of the three approaches, pathos is the most immediately
effective, acting as a means of short-circuiting logic and rational
thought and aiming to evoke an immediate emotional response.
3This is not to invoke a strong subject–object distinction denoting the object of
description need not define the content and sources of subjects.
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This is due to the emotional nature of decision-making.
When appealing to pathos, punctuation can be a valuable tool.
Punctuation was shown to act as a marker for propaganda in
Israeli political discourse (Shukrun-Nagar, 2009).
Logos: appeal to logic
Any logos-based approach is highly challenging. Human beings
are driven primarily by emotions, and the use of logical reasoning
and data-driven persuasion will founder on the lack of statistical
and general mathematical knowledge in the general public.
Of course, statistics can be easily manipulated to customize
narratives. In some cases, as noted by Pomerantsev and Weiss
(2014), any narrative can be created, and a supporting reality can
be created to support that narrative.
Partial truths and decontextualized facts. This type of logic is
sometimes effective in political and scientific arenas. Consider
the antivaccination movement that believed that vaccinations
caused autism (Gross, 2009). An unexplained rise in the number
of autism cases along with a discredited article from a scientist
(Wakefield, 1999) with celebrity endorsements (Antrim, 2018)
sounding credible created a combination of an ethos- and logos-
based appeal. Many conspiracy theories contain elements of
logos mixed with pathos. The messaging must include terms and
resonate with the target audience; word choices should reflect
similar or the same words that the targeted group would use.
Psychology: Understanding Individual Behaviors and
Thoughts
Humans are fundamentally social creatures. Our social worlds are
complex and require us to sift through information to determine
what is truthful and what we need to know to maximize
our survival and personal growth. However, the amount of
information that we process is extensive and, in our digital age,
delivered to us at high intensity. As noted previously, heuristics
are strategies that we use to take cognitive shortcuts in order
to handle this information overload (Tversky and Kahneman,
1983) and are also known as cognitive biases. On occasion,
these biases may lead us to come to the wrong conclusion
or to take the wrong action, but ultimately such biases are
an adaptive strategy that helps us navigate our environment.
Nevertheless, these biases may be targeted and exploited by the
authors of fake news. For example, the secrecy heuristics may
lead people to believe that any information that is presented
as being from a secret source is more reliable (Travers et al.,
2014). This heuristic is exploited in fake news stories that
proclaim to reveal “leaked” information. The acceptance of fake
news can be further increased through the use of images to
accompany the narrative that is being put forward (Newman
et al., 2012), which again may exploit biases by leading the
reader to assume that a visual “record” is further evidence that
a story is truthful. The inclusion of an image to accompany a
fake news story also increases the likelihood that the story will
be shared on social media (Fenn et al., 2019). Echo chambers
(Boutyline and Willer, 2017) and filter bubbles (Holone, 2016)
created through social media platforms may further reinforce
these cognitive processes, through the aforementioned heuristic
of confirmation bias (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). Research
suggests that the acceptance of fake news items can be combatted
through the application of epistemic cognition, which refers
to how we gather knowledge about our world and develop
our belief systems.
Our understanding of our social world is also influenced by
what we perceive to be the beliefs and attitudes of our peers.
As noted above, this can lead to the proliferation of fake news,
but the same social influence can also be a powerful tool in
combatting fake news. Indeed, it has been observed that viewing
critical comments from friends that challenge fake news items on
social media is more effective, and prompting people to question
the item themselves than a disclaimer from the social media
provider stating that item appears to be fake (Colliander, 2019).
Emotions are another determinant of the acceptance or
rejection of fake news, as predicted under the feelings-as-
information theory (Schwarz, 2012). Falsehoods are 70% more
likely to be retweeted than the truth (Vosoughi et al., 2018). This
could relate to several other forms of cognitive bias. Survival
information bias refers to our tendency to pay attention to
information that relates to the health and well-being of ourselves
or those we care about (Stubbersfield et al., 2015). An example
of this would be the tales of poison found within Halloween
candy that are shared among parents each year, despite there
being no record of this ever happening (Snopes, 2020). Such
stories that invoke survival information bias in turn prompt
emotional reactions. Similarly, social information bias refers to
our tendency to attend to information that represents some form
of deviation from social values or social norms (Stubbersfield
et al., 2015). An example of the exploitation of this type of bias
would be fake news stories, which are based on a politician
or celebrity being involved in a conspiracy of some type. This
again stimulates an emotional response, which as predicted
by the feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz, 2012) may be
accepted as truthful. In keeping with theories of social gossip,
this information is then shared throughout the individual’s social
network, as it has been identified by the individual as being of
importance (Mesoudi et al., 2006). This continual reposting and
endorsement of a fake news item throughout a social network
may contribute to the phenomenon of illusory truth, the effect
exploited by marketers in advertisements for many years in which
statements that are repeated are seen as being more truthful
(Dechene et al., 2010), a phenomenon observed in relation to
fake news stories such as those relating to vaccines and autism
(Unkelbach et al., 2019).
One argument made is that people will tend to assume that
information they are exposed to is truthful, as they draw upon
their experience of the base rate where most of the facts they
encounter in their lives are mundane and accurate (Brashier
and Marsh, 2020). This assumption may be attributed to an
anchoring bias where the target believes that because they are
honest, news sources are also honest. This is compounded when
the information is received from a trusted source (Flanagin and
Metzger, 2014).
Differences in cognitive ability appear to be another factor
that predicts how easily a fake news story can be countered,
with individuals who have low cognitive ability being less
likely to change their initial acceptance of fake information
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when explicitly presented with the correct information (De
Keersmaecker and Roets, 2017). This also relates to another
cognitive bias known as the anchoring heuristic in which people
will tend to keep any subsequent judgments close to their initial
judgment, even if that initial judgment is proven to them to be
incorrect (Northcraft and Neale, 1987). A Cognitive Reflection
Test is used by Pennycook and Rand (2019) to show that
susceptibility to fake news is dependent thinking rather than
partisan bias; others support this rationale by citing increased
vulnerability because of reduced analytical thinking and less
open-mindedness (Bronstein et al., 2019).
Sociology
Cultural values and divisions caused by cultural values are
used to define and continue the dialog. In many of the most
recent cases, these values are used to stoke divisions and
amplify societal polarizations (Azzimonti and Fernandes, 2018).
Interestingly, many of the divisions within the targeted society
are tribal in nature, indicating that certain base values are
similar in both groups (i.e., a desire to be treated equally; a
desire to freely express one’s views) but that the “in group”
versus “out group” dynamic that defines tribes within a society
is the targeted societal fissure. This is relevant because if
the base values are the same, the targeted groups can be
manipulated into thinking that the other group is the problem
using many of the same techniques. An example of such
behaviors may occur when one group within a society seeks
equal rights, and another group perceives that in order for
the first group to gain rights, they must lose or give up some
of their own rights. While, logically this is not the case, the
perception remains.
Higher technologic capabilities and interactions associate
with greater vulnerability to information warfare campaigns
(Szfranski, 1997). The information systems make possible the
transmission of information at much greater speeds and volume,
and interpretation of the information occurs with the human.
Szfranski (1997) identified a strategic and tactical component
that identifies identification (strategic) and restricting (tactical)
disinformation. We argue that at the strategic level a fully
integrated interdisciplinary response is required in order to
accurately respond at the tactical level.
Orientation differs based on cultural values and heritage
(Szfranski, 1997). Russia has been particularly active in stoking
the immigration crisis in European Union countries (Volodymyr,
2016). By speaking to fears of “outsiders” invading countries, an
increase in nationalism has arisen in host countries; specifically,
Russia has created and supported right-wing narratives that speak
to native citizens’ fears of loss of cultural values and general
well-being (ibid). Culturally speaking, most Western democracies
exhibit a coexistence of high and low uncertainty avoidance
(UAI) values (Hofstede et al., 2010). Hofstede et al. (2010) noted
an association between nationalism and high UAI cultural values.
According to Hofstede et al. (2010), high UAI values reflect a
fear or uneasiness with the unknown, whereas low UAI values
associate with a curiosity and willingness to learn about the
unknown. The stoking of these and other cultural fissures or
differences, in an open society, is easier with social media due to
the wide reach of the communications medium.
Successful campaigns impose false realities on the human
targets (Szfranski, 1997). Open societies are vulnerable to
alternative viewpoints, the willingness to accept various
viewpoints (Hofstede et al., 2010; Nisbett, 2010; Minkov, 2013;
Sample, 2015), while normally a strength and defense against
weaponized information (Szfranski, 1997), these cultural norms
have been used against these societies through the promotion
of carefully crafted false narratives that are in many cases quite
sophisticated, and in all cases customized to the values of the
targeted audience (Volodymyr, 2016; Sample et al., 2018).
Political Science: Influencing Policies
Fake news, or the tactical use of manipulative communications in
a political context, serves to deceive political actors in relation to
their strategic intentions regarding a situation. That may involve
efforts to distort political positions and options so as to move
citizens to vote (or refrain from voting) on grounds that misalign
their preferences and actions. It may seek to cloud decision spaces
for voters or political authorities by introducing spurious issues
that misdirect attention. It may seek to inflame relationships
between groups in a population by amplifying differences. In
this sense, maligned fake news campaigns may be thought of
as activities that place additional stress on political systems,
thereby undermining their capacities to govern. On the other
hand, a similar fake news campaign might deceive populations
or political authorities in a direction that increases perceptions of
trust, legitimacy, or the performance of the political authorities
or the underlying system of governance (Easton, 1975). These
are the elements of a political system that might be subject to
support or stress; too much stress, Easton noted, could lead
to system break down and violence). These latter efforts to
support a political system by celebrating its achievements are
a common practice in non-democratic countries such as the
People’s Republic of China where government employees are
often called upon to promote the legitimacy of the CCP online,
and an increasingly strict regime of censorship has prevented
the emergence of critical commentary online (King et al., 2017;
Jensen and Chen, forthcoming). Such efforts might artificially
inflate the support for a system to serve the interests of an existing
elite and order at the expense of efforts from the public to change
the system. Either situation undermines democratic participation
in a political system through distortions in the capacity to provide
feedback and in its receipt by citizens and/or political authorities.
Political science treatments of “fake news” have focused on two
distinct aspects. First, there is a question of whether foreign actors
spreading fake news could have distorted the election results
in 2016 in the United States. Second, scholars have studied the
growing use of the term in recent time within political contexts,
particularly its use as an epithet against journalists and perceived
(other) political opponents. In terms of the interference question,
the majority of the research suggests that it has had little impact
on elections for two reasons. First, it is hard to distinguish Russian
troll communications from other online sources, particularly
those of the alt-right (Benkler et al., 2018). This delineation
between Russia and alt-right publications is blurred since Russia
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today is a primary source of news stories for alt-right publications
(Dorrell, 2017) that proceed to pass their article to mainstream
conservative sites.
Related to this is the fact that domestic sources of news
production and the campaigns themselves had considerably
further reach than the Russian efforts, so it is unclear why Russian
trolling would have produced an outsized effect compared
to these other sources (Sides et al., 2018). Further, there is
general doubt about the extent to which online manipulation
campaigns have any effects based on research that shows
political campaigning to general has neutral effects as competing
campaigns cancel each other out (Kalla and Broockman, 2018).
Underlying the analysis in political science is a focus on
information as the relevant unit of analysis in understanding
the effects of fake news or manipulative campaigning. This
focus owes its legacy to studies of voters and voter behavior,
which have emphasized the role of campaigns and media
outlets in transmitting information to voters who make up their
minds (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn, 1990). Information efforts are
considered independent of each other such that all information
received, whether from a foreign state actor’s manipulation
campaign or domestic news sources, is equivalent in their
potential effects. Jamieson (2018) notes that this is not necessarily
the case as Russia has appeared to sequence its messaging in
relation to information, which was not necessarily public at the
time, and the sequencing of Russian activity and other actions
can have unique and amplifying effects.
Further, although the literature in political science tends to
find little evidence of a net effect of campaigning on voter choices,
there are a few categories of places where they do find effects
that may amplify the effects of targeted foreign interference
activities. First, there is evidence that such campaigns have effects
where candidates have controversial positions, and there is a lot
of investment in mobilizing voters supporting those positions
(Kalla and Broockman, 2018). That would be consistent with
the normalization effects that a coordinated covert influence
campaign can have by making certain positions appear more
reasonable through repetition (Kahneman, 2011). Second, there
is evidence that messages that provide grounds for people to
express fear and to take a limited and discrete action based on that
message (e.g., like, retweet, vote once) can help create a persuasive
narrative identity narrative for a voter (Jamieson, 2018).
Beyond that, there is a literature in political science focused on
“misinformation.” Misinformation is often distinguished from
disinformation in that the former is factually incorrect (a category
overlapping with definitions of fake news), whereas the latter
involves the intentional distribution of factually false claims
for the purposes of inducing a political effect (Bennett and
Livingston, 2018; Chadwick et al., 2018; Tucker et al., 2018). In
relation to the misinformation literature, there is research into the
efficacy of correctives (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010, 2015; Vraga and
Bode, 2017). Some evidence suggests that false information can
be corrected, but those effects tend to be limited to cases where
an article of belief is not directly connected to one’s belief and
identity structure (Garrett et al., 2013).
Finally, there is an area of study in political science on
the use of the term, “fake news,” as a political epithet.
Journalists and political opponents have been targeted with
this term (Tandoc et al., 2018). Research shows that since
the election of Donald Trump, there has been an upswing
in the use of the term by politicians as an attack on
others in places such as Australia, and the use of the term
is usually amplified through reporting in mainstream news
where it is not contested (Farhall et al., 2019). Propaganda
historically has been understood by political scientists to not
only provide a favorable narrative for one’s own side but
also to demoralize the enemy and undermine their will to
continue the fight (Lasswell, 1927). There are wider corrosive
effects on politics that some ascribe to this current era where
the ability to know truths is often put into question, with
some suggesting that we live in a “post-truth” political era
(Keane, 2018). The consequence of undermining trust in political
authorities, expertise, and expert systems can have many systemic
implications beyond the discrete consequence of swaying an
election as it can make a political system on the whole
ungovernable through its polarizing effects (Singer and Brooking,
2018). Fake news today may involve a combination of foreign
and self-inflicted wounds, which erode the will of citizens to
participate in democratic political life—precisely the condition
Tocqueville feared would give rise to a form of despotism
(Tocqueville, 2010).
While the fake news has played a prominent role in politics,
the movement of fake news into health and science is especially
troubling. Particularly with COVID-19, the ramifications are
serious, and in many cases deadly. In one case a couple chose
to take chloroquine based on empty speculation about the drug
and died (Neuman, 2020). In this case, the scientific community
called for research, and the story as well as the scientific process
became politicized.
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity, a relatively new domain of war (Lynn, 2010),
was slow to react to the fake news phenomenon despite the
fact that information systems, particularly social media, were
widely deployed in the targeting, delivery, and dissemination
of disinformation. Some of the reluctance to engage centered
around the censorship versus freedom of speech argument, but
another reason for the reluctance was financial. Social media
sites such as Facebook have business models that are heavily
reliant on advertising money. Interestingly, Taboola has been
a common advertiser associated with fake news (Neilsen and
Graves, 2017).
The argument continued, but a change occurred when the
role of Facebook and other social media sites became known
in the selling of personal information to Cambridge Analytica
(Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018; Risso, 2018), where
the data were mined for use in political circles. The sharing of
personal information crossed the privacy boundary that is one
of the core tenant areas of cybersecurity (McCumber, 1991). The
sale of user personal data (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison,
2018; Risso, 2018) and the customization of disinformation for
the targeted users supported Szfranski (1997) assertion that
civilians as well as military personnel will need protection
from disinformation.
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Szfranski (1997) observed that information systems are the
primary means by which adversaries collect information on
targets. Artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms that create and
re-enforce filter bubbles (Sîrbu et al., 2019) can amplify the
development of echo chambers, reducing the individual’s ability
to find unbiased news. Furthermore, personas in the filter bubble
in agreement with the target’s views gain credibility with that
group. Filter bubbles are further discussed in Data Science:
Processing Large Volumes of Fake News of this article.
The speed and reach of the internet enabled the rapid spread
of disinformation, suggesting that any viable solution to counter
the spread will require the automation and detection associated
with cybersecurity to play a role in this endeavor (Cybenko et al.,
2002; Horne and Adali, 2017; Sample et al., 2018). Furthermore,
Russian campaigns have been characterized by the intensity
of their use of information systems to promote narratives
(Volodymyr, 2016; Payne, 2017; Jensen and Sample, 2019).
Volodymyr (2016) identified large-scale ongoing hybrid
operations that relied heavily on Internet connectivity and social
media outlet including Syria (Turkey), the European Union, and
Ukraine. Since then NATO and liberal Western democracies
have been added to the list for operations that originate in
Russia. Other countries and groups have been encouraged by
Russia’s success. The global nature of the problem that resulted
in an unanticipated use of Internet technologies made digital
deceptions such as fake news and deep fakes a problem that now
belongs in part to cybersecurity.
The drivers for change within the cybersecurity field are
not currently strong enough to lead to the development
of solutions. Until nation states seek to apply larger-scale
solutions and adopt policy changes that encourage the security
of individual privacy rights, the cybersecurity industry has
no incentive as a financially driven business area to address
the problem. Indeed, commercial bodies have helped create
this situation by repeatedly removing individual rights for
privacy on the internet and creating a new norm, accepted
by users, which they should trade their data for convenient
services. A combination of commercial and legal drivers with
strong law enforcement and government agency support has
eroded anonymity on the internet. A strong incentive to
change existing norms is likely to come from the application
of targeted information operations on political, military, and
critical national security personnel on a scale that forces policy
changes. However, without such a driver, until this paradigm
changes and there are legal or financial costs associated with
the commercialization of user data on the Internet, the main
drivers enabling online fake news will continue. Unfortunately,
the commercialization and lobbying that have emerged in this
area make it unlikely that the cybersecurity industry will be
able to address this problem in the near term, except as
a supporting role to respond to policy change. Efforts to
integrate financial payment systems with social media and news
outlets are likely to further exacerbate the problem. In the
meantime, greater education of users and policy makers and
focused attempts to secure users through anonymized and secure
applications are probably the best short-term solutions available
to cybersecurity practitioners.
Data Science: Processing Large Volumes of Fake
News
The work performed by Cambridge Analytica (Risso, 2018)
exemplifies the growth of data science in the fake news space.
Originally used in marketing, another discipline that processes
inputs from psychology, sociology, and the arts, the algorithms
have been more recently applied to political goals. There are
several different types of algorithms ranging from history-based
heuristics, through trees and neural networks. Each of these
algorithms can be manipulated through their data to either re-
enforce preferences or to steer preferences into a new direction.
Furthermore, the algorithm-created filter bubbles that re-enforce
beliefs are amoral and probabilistic in nature; thus, the stories
presented to the user are similar in tone and accuracy.
The ability to manipulate AI outputs extends beyond fake
news propagation and into all aspects of AI and machine
learning (ML). The example of Tay (Risley, 2016), the Microsoft
chatbot that was trained to be helpful, but ultimately became
abusive, illustrates the ability to manipulate AI and unintended
direction through input manipulation of legitimate data. Weight
and data manipulation fuels research into adversarial machine
learning (AML) and malicious use of AI (MUAI), and many
of the deceptions that other domains encountered occurred
earlier in fake news.
The application of AI and ML in the creation, dissemination,
and countering of fake news represents a growth area in data
science, and as such, much has yet to be discovered. Deep fakes
provide an example of this growth area. While data science
can provide fascinating new insights to existing problems, the
examples listed above remind us that the power of data science
techniques can be used for benign, malevolent, or benevolent
applications. A key point to remember in data science is the
importance of the query being processed. The phrasing of a query
sets the algorithm on a weighted path based on the data learned
during the ML process. Depending on the data classifications,
results can vary to the same query; this action is observable when
two people enter the same query into a search engine and receive
different results.
Despite the problems that AI and ML introduce, combatting
fake news and other digital deceptions will be a job for
AI/ML; Horne and Adali (2017) have already shown successes
in using ML trained hosts to detect fake news. The accuracy
will improve as the rules become more complete. Should the
rules lack completeness, then fake news detection will be limited
to detecting stories that fit a known pattern, signatures in
cybersecurity parlance, and signatures have a low to non-existent
detection rate with novel approaches. AI/ML are extremely
proficient at detecting patterns, but the patterns must be familiar
to the software, hence the need to create rules based on knowledge
garnered from other disciplines.
Theater: News as Entertainment
“All the world is a stage” (Shakespeare, 2009), and fake news has
a theatrical aspect. Theater can be thought of as a communal
art form where the audience and performer share the roles of
subject, spectator, and benefactor (Abaka, 2014). Similarly, fake
news, particularly in an interactive mode of delivery (i.e., talk
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radio, live interactive TV news shows, social media, etc.), creates
the same dynamic.
Theater, like fake news, is also interdisciplinary. The theater
consists of eight major disciplines:
acting, directing, writing, producing, costumes, set, sound,
and lighting design (Jones, 2004). Each of these disciplines is
discussed along with their role in the creation and delivery of fake
news in support of seeking a shared, desired intention within the
story and the audience.
Theater requires the disciplines working together to create
or manipulate the audiences’ thoughts and feelings. Fake news
particularly uses propaganda delivered on trusted mediums in
personal spaces such as talk radio in a car, TV in the home,
and social media on cell phones and personal computers. All of
these devices are trusted transmission sources for the user. The
messaging deploying the use of previously described propaganda
techniques is delivered in an environment that the user has
already deemed trustworthy.
The story is most effectively told when the disciplines fuse
together, creating a final product that is greater than the sum
of the collective parts Jones (Hostetter and Hostetter, 2011).
Actors use voice, facial expression, and body movement to
convey the message that captures and unites the conscious and
unconscious minds through shared presentation and decoding
of words and symbols (Hostetter and Hostetter, 2011). Similarly,
reporters and commentators use their voice, facial expressions,
and body movement to both consciously and unconsciously
deliver a message.
Actors prepare by not only memorizing lines, but also by
drawing on emotional experiences that audiences can easily
understand and find relatable, by using physical movement
through expressions and body movement to convey emotions
bringing to life the text of pathos. Once the message has been
crafted, the delivery must seal the emotional hold.
Once the message has been successfully delivered and sealed,
the re-enforcement can be taken care of through secondary
actors known as trolls and bots. Trolls, paid personnel used
to amplify a message can assume the role of unseen actors
in support of maintain the target’s engagement. Bots are the
automated counterpart of the troll, performing the same duties
through the use of AI.
An actor seeks to tap into the audiences’ emotional memory
(Stanislavski, 1989). Sight and sound are entryways into the
imagination. Once an actor commands these two senses, they
have a pathway into the imagination and can direct and
manipulate the mind. Stanislavski (1989) considered sight and
sound the two primary senses, and touch, smell, and taste
secondary senses that can be triggered through the primary
senses. Stanislavski (1989) noted that if an actor can appeal
to only one of the senses, the remaining senses will also be
available to the actor, all in support of influencing the audience’s
emotional memory. One part of the director’s responsibility
is to work with the actors to set the tone and intention for
the play. The news director works with the news anchor to
convey the tone and content of the story. The same news story
compared across news stations can vary in length, tone, and
detail (Sample et al., 2018). In the case of interactive news,
much like in the theater, mood and emotions can be extracted
from an audience.
Another important role that the theater director plays is in
deciding what parts of the story remain and what parts are
cut. Similarly, in the news media, the director/producer/editor
determines which stories, or portions of the selected story, are
presented to the audience. Recalling the earlier discussion on
thinking, an event that is not sensed is not perceived. As with
AI/ML, the flow of information is controlled by an entity in
support of a specific intention.
The writer relies on words, language, rhythm, pacing, and
musicality of language to be delivered by a skilled actor or anchor.
All are well-crafted and integrated to achieve the intention of the
story. The integrated whole is executed to play upon the values
and beliefs of their audience. The use of memorable quotes or
rhymes creates an indelible memory for the audience and the
actor. Word choice for the story writer fits into manipulative
linguistic choices, particularly those associated with pathos.
Easily remembered phrases associated with fake news are effective
methods of delivering a memorable message.
The producer is the person in charge of operations
including hiring of directors, actors, and other personnel
who support the vision. Casting of anchors and reports
sends an enormous conscious and unconscious message
to the audience. Attractive speakers benefit from the halo
effect, while less attractive speakers are perceived as being
more untrustworthy (Zebrowitz and Franklin, 2014). This
finding suggests that a less attractive person would need to
compensate for the untrustworthy impression, possibly by using
intellect. The producer is responsible for all aspects of the
production from vision, through operations and budgeting.
In short, the producer is the production CEO possessing the
holistic vision.
Costumes add a sensual authenticity to the production.
Something as seemingly small as hair and make-up can have
a significant effect on how the audience perceives the actor in
theater or the reporter for news. Consider the appearances of
various news hosts and the consistency of appearance on each
of the major news stations. Suits for men are the costume with
ties being carefully chosen. Women, while not forced to wear
suits, also have clothing rules that allow for some flexibility
of choice (Hillman, 2013). Within the range of professional
clothing attire, a range exists for various articles of clothing and
accessories (Crilli, 2014; Moeslein, 2019). A clear difference can
be observed when viewing before and after pictures of liberal and
conservative program hosts.
Set design provides the context or the visual environment.
Color can set the emotional tone. For news, a simple calming
blue background attracts attention, as does the color red (Hillyard
and Münte, 1984), which suggests serious fact-based messaging.
Red is a universal alerting color that people are trained to stop
and focus their attention on (Kuniecki et al., 2015). Breaking
news alerts appear on a red background. When delivering fake
news, a set matches the color scheme and set design of the
traditional mainstream media news station where the news
anchors are seated but leaning forward. A well-thought-out set
design seamlessly supports the reporter’s performance.
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Audio is the presence or absence of background sounds such
as music; voices and other sounds are also used to set the mood
and manipulate emotions. Dark low-pitched music accompanied
with dark lighting and a dark background suggests a sense of
foreboding, preparing the audience for bad news.
Lighting is the remaining theatrical discipline. Lights and
the shadows cast by lights allow for creating a perception.
Shadows cast over an object suggest something to hide or
untrustworthiness. Bright light suggests honesty and integrity.
A harsh bright light suggests shining a light on a dark or dirty
subject, exposing what was hidden.
All of these to point out the conscious effort of an entire
production team to seek out the desired behavior, thinking, and
feeling of a target audience. When executed with precision and
art, the audience has no real defensive against it. Even the best of
professionals in this field find themselves taken away and moved
by the production. The actor must live it, feel it, and experience
the depth of human nature supported by all the other disciplines
to achieve the goal of a super objective set by producers, directors,
and writers. How better to manipulate people into seeing things
our way and buying in to joining our team.
For years, the delineation between news and entertainment
has continued to blur (Edgerly, 2017). News reporters, while
publicly claiming neutrality, can convey messaging through
expressions, intonation, and movements, all methods of non-
verbal communication that actors draw on. Reporters can convey
joy, anger disgust, outrage, and other emotions without changing
the text of the story. The goal of all news reporters, much
like an actor, is to keep the audience’s attention. To that
end, reporters, particularly television and other video reporters,
like actors, wear make-up, perform in well-lit conditions, and
engage with the camera. Through costume, make-up, set design,
writing, direction, lighting, and sound, the reporter, much
like the actor, sets out to elicit the audience’s emotional and
physical response.
Cybenko et al. (2002) noted the mundane aspects of factual
data. While linguistics offers a strong starting point and works
well with textual data, the staging of events such as protests
(Gu et al., 2017; Mueller, 2019, p. 29) requires inputs from
theater. Theater, like all art, relies on sensory stimulation. Theater
integrates sensory experiences relying on triggering sight and
sound directly and touch, smell, and taste indirectly. These
inputs are designed to trigger sensing from the target, to
shape the perception.
LESSONS LEARNED FOR COUNTERING
FAKE NEWS
Because the problem is interdisciplinary in nature, any response
that does not take into account the various disciplines can
only partially succeed at best. This means that models must
be superimposed and incorporated into the response. While an
automated response favors data science and cybersecurity, this
response will not fully succeed if linguistics, psychology, and
sociology, along with the frameworks defined in those disciplines,
are not fused into the solution.
Data science provides insights but requires carefully worded
questions and subject knowledge in order to form the best, most
comprehensive queries. Cybersecurity-informed solutions tend
to be reactive, suggesting that queries posed by cybersecurity
personnel may lack abstraction and will result in no new insights
even when new problem sites are discovered. Furthermore, the
overall reactive posture may result in software missing new styles
and techniques in fake news creation and dissemination.
When combining data science and linguistics, computational
linguistics offers some of the tools that can enable rapid detection
of propaganda; however, natural language processors (NLPs)
have shortcomings that may be unfamiliar to data scientists. NLPs
used in computational linguistics are able to quickly synthesize
large volumes of data presenting common themes through “bag
of words” outputs and sentiment analysis. An explanation of
problems in each area follows.
NLP Problems
Natural language processors group together common words
and group emergent patterns in written text. In order to do
so efficiently, several things must happen that can result in
misleading outputs for the data scientist who programs the
software, including punctuation removal, case changing, word-
stemming, and filler word removal.
• Punctuation removal is problematic because “!” and “?”
and quotation marks are all a part of the sensationalism
that elicits emotional responses from the reader (Shukrun-
Nagar, 2009; Cohen et al., 2018).
• Case changing occurs when software evaluates words the
ASCII representation for “News” is different than the
one for “news.” In order to work around this problem,
uppercase letters are converted to lowercase, and in most
cases, no problems result. However, with emotion-driven
fake news, words in all uppercase are present to stimulate
the visual sense; by changing these words to all lowercase,
an important textual clue is removed.
• Word-stemming results when NLPs convert adverbs to
verbs, or convert verb tenses to the root word, so that
“quickly” and “quicken” become “quick.” The problem is
adverbs are words that are used to elicit an emotional
response (pathos); by stemming these words, another
textual clue is removed.
• Filler word removal is performed when NLPs remove words
such as “the,” “and,” and “he” with the goal of avoiding filler
words outweighing nouns and verbs. The problem is that
the removal of pronouns also results in the removal of “us,”
“we,” “they,” “them,” important words in the “us” versus
“them” narrative oftentimes deployed in propaganda.
The problems listed above are easily solved when the
programmer is aware of their existence, and most often, the
programmer remains unaware. The problem is that the NLP
packages are a part of a larger software development effort, and
the aforementioned examples are not considered. The developers
do not know what they do not know. In many cases, packages can
be modified, or preprocessers can be written that quickly address
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these problems. Much of NLP work aids AI/ML rules, so knowing
the correct query to make falls outside of the expertise of the
programmer tasked with writing the software.
Countering Content
Cybenko et al. (2002) noted the importance of detecting the
attack before the narrative can affect the target’s behavior.
Of course, this suggestion seems to work posteriori as a
method to prevent repeat mistakes. One suggestion was to
detect the preconditions that exist as a method to inoculate
the target (ibid). Another would be to incorporate rules of
propaganda into computational linguistics. The authors propose
that three-point model of computational linguistics to address
contextualization of data, as well as the descriptiveness, pattern-
spread analysis to address the temporal aspect, and archival
reputation analysis that adds temporal, context, and descriptive
values for additional analysis.
Computational Linguistics—Contextualization and
Descriptive Analysis
Fake news, by its very nature, consists of texts. Sometimes
multimodal (employing, for example, audiovisual material),
but overwhelmingly written compositions, designed to be
transmitted (and retransmitted) across electronic/digital media
to a carefully selected target audience. As communicative
artifacts, they are open to analysis through linguistic tools, and
as persuasive communications, they can be related to the body of
work that has been done over centuries relating to rhetoric (the
art of persuasive communication) in general, and propaganda in
particular (see, inter alia, Ellul, 1965; Jowett and O’Donnell, 1986;
Pratkanis and Aronson, 1992; Connelly and Welch, 2003).
Despite the list of problems enumerated above with NLPs, for
those engaged in combatting fake news, the ability to employ
computer-aided social network analysis offers great potential for
mapping (and ideally countering) the spread on misinformation
online, by quickly identifying the key vectors of fake news and
tracking (in near-real-time) the flow of fake news across the Web
(Hardaker and McGlashan, 2016; Chetty and Alathur, 2018). The
use of Computational and Computer-Aided Corpus Linguistics
(the identification of key textual features through comparison of
a target text with a corpus or corpora of reference texts) offers
a real possibility to create automated tools for the identification
of fake news through its linguistic content and its removal from
social media without human intervention and for automated
generation of effective counter-texts (Pérez-Rosas et al., 2018;
Marquardt, 2019; Pathak and Srihari, 2019).
The rules of propaganda are well understood, and the ability
to modify software to enforce rules is attainable, particularly
when ML is combined with statistical tools such as group
comparisons and correlations to compare text. Many of the
lexical expressions found in propaganda are synonyms, which
can easily translate to neighboring words in ML classifiers (e.g.,
“step” and “leap”); thus, when phrases containing neighboring
words are evaluated computationally, they will show that the
distance between is statistically insignificant. Compared against
the traditional phrases used in conversation where the word
distance is statistically different, the ability to analyze and provide
decision-making assistance is near real time.
The other areas listed above can be quickly evaluated
using simple linguistic tools or even scripts that can strip out
and quantify punctuation symbols before they are removed
without record. Similarly, the stemming problem can also be
addressed as a part of the preprocessing while preserving the
important metadata. Computational linguistics works alongside
data science and can provide much of the inputs needed to feed
training data rules.
Pattern Spread—Temporal Analysis
In order for fake news to spread, stories must be artificially
promoted using trolls and bots (Rosenblatt, 2018). The use of
these aids leaves digital traces. Vosoughi et al. (2018) illustrated
this phenomenon showing the extreme volume of stories that
saturate the news cycle. When combined with the credibility
of receiving these false narratives from trusted sources and the
speed in which these stories spread, preemptive inoculation can
become problematic. The OSoMe toolbox developed at Indiana
University4 is another tool that illustrates the overwhelming
spread of fake news. So that even the informed reader, when
trying to gather information on alternative views, not only does
not receive those stories due to AI algorithm weighting, but
also the overwhelming volume of stories with the fake narrative
(Gu et al., 2017; Sample et al., 2018; Jensen and Sample, 2019).
Presently fake news spread patterns are rather distinct, but since
they rely on automated software. they can be easily adjusted.
In addition to providing a dominant narrative in volume, this
flooding behavior also manipulates sentiment analysis, providing
deceptive data to analysts.
Suggestions by Cybenko et al. (2002) included information
trajectory modeling as a countering tactic. Information trajectory
allows for comparisons against historic data and distance
measuring from the historic data. This approach can be used to
model pattern spread as well as linguistic differences and was
proposed by Sample et al. (2018). However, unlike the linguistics
component, there exists a lack of data for pattern spread of factual
narratives, and factual narratives will have varying baselines
depending on the nature of the story. For example, a natural
disaster with many casualties will show a different pattern spread
than a special interest story, which differs from a news story
surrounding a celebrity. If the fake pattern is the area of focus, the
parties responsible will alter the behavior to keep the filters from
detecting the pattern; in cybersecurity, this is known as “fuzzing.”
“Fuzzing” occurs when a character is changed in the signature
string, allowing the new malicious data to slip in, undetected by
the security filters.
Metadata Analysis of Archival Information—Time,
Content, Context, and Reputations
Data science has been used and suggested for solutions to digital
deception. This shows the enduring value of messenger credibility
as discussed by Flanagin and Metzger (2014). Reputations can
be discredited for an affordable cost, and reporters are human,
4http://osome.iuni.inu.edu/
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so mistakes will happen. A gullible reporter who is repeatedly
fooled may not have a very long career in his/her chosen field,
but a reporter who consistently reports the facts, with or without
theatrics, will have a pattern that is worthy of being considered
credible. Currently, this process is performed by humans when
they evaluate the credibility of a source, and as we previously
discussed, the human decision-making process in this area is
flawed and under attack.
Data science can go beyond sentiment analysis and some
of the other techniques discussed earlier in this article. Every
proposed countering technique will generate metadata, data
about the collected data. This data are prime for fresh insights.
Some of the metadata fields of interest would include, but
not be limited to, reporter information, publisher information,
time information, context content, and linguistic characteristics.
A brief discussion follows.
• Reporter information: Reporter bias scores, average story
word count, average linguistic characteristics associated
with reporter including % nouns, verbs, adjectives
and adverbs, publisher associations, credibility score,
and sources used.
• Publisher information: Publication bias scores, average
story word count, average linguistic characteristics,
reporters used, credibility score, average story lifecycle,
average time to report, sources used.
Time information is important because fake news typically
has short lifecycles because once the deception is discovered, not
everyone wishes to propagate it further; thus, time distance from
original source, lifecycle, early source trajectory.
This archive of metadata with the small sample set of fields
provides a starting point and is by no means complete. This
starting point allows for groupings to answer known questions
and unstructured analysis groupings to inspire new lines of
thought and question. Furthermore, by collecting and processing
metadata, the actual use space is smaller, resulting in a smaller
and more efficient archive, which contains links to the larger
complete archives.
The Role of Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning
The need to understand the rules in order to create AI/ML
rules otherwise signatures on steroids is discussed. Using ML
software and satire as training data, Horne and Adali (2017)
were successful in demonstrating software could successfully
detect fake news in the form of satire. While the findings
were encouraging the study looked for a specific type of
fake news, satire.
AI is highly dependent on the classification schemes attained
through ML, and both AI and ML are highly dependent on
the accuracy and veracity of the training data used. The fact
that in cybersecurity the poisoning of training data is an area
of research should serve as a cautionary point. When rules are
done well, AI and ML can easily outperform humans on many
tasks; however, questions remain open on AI biases that may
be intentionally or unintentionally inserted by the programmer
(Bellovin, 2019). Biases have been observed in facial recognition
software (Nagpal et al., 2019), resulting in unanticipated outputs.
The importance of balancing the training data requirements
results in having to balance inadequate data that yield false
results, or overfitting provides accurate findings but with little
to no abstraction. Striking this necessary balance requires an
understanding of rules that lie outside the discipline of data
science and cybersecurity, the two disciplines in the enforcement
arena, and into the behavioral sciences space.
Game Theory to Inoculate—An Alternative Approach
Immunizations against diseases occur from patient exposure to
a weakened form of the virus; this forms the basis for work
done at Cambridge University (Van der Linden et al., 2017;
Roozenbeek and Van Der Linden, 2019). While game theory was
not discussed above, game theory does incorporate many of the
aspects discussed in the previously mentioned disciplines that
feed decision-making. The researchers found that by exposing
participants to fake news stories. The researchers at Cambridge
introduced the topic of attitudinal inoculation where subjects
are warned preemptively, and false narratives are preemptively
debunked, so that when exposed to deceptive data, they discard
the information. Similar approaches work in cybersecurity
when users are preemptively warned about spam and malware
(Bindra, 2010). The research shows promise but requires prior
knowledge of the false narrative before the narrative is created
and distributed. In some controversial areas such as politics and
climate, science may be difficult to anticipate the new narrative,
or in cybersecurity terms, the zero-day narrative. In other areas,
such as fake news surrounding medicine or economics news, the
scope is more limited, making possible success in the exercise
in anticipation.
EXAMPLES USING THE MODEL
The three-point model relies on evaluating using linguistic
features, pattern spread, and archival reputation analysis.
Included are some examples of the evaluations. On February 16,
2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic was in the early stages,
Dr. Anthony Fauci was interviewed by CBS news on the show
Face the Nation. A transcript of the show5 can be found in
the public domain. Dr. Fauci’s remarks about the virus were
approximately 646 words, containing no special punctuation,
and the ratio of adverbs to text was 1:215. A few days later on
February 25, 2020, Rush Limbaugh also shared thoughts on the
same subject, the virus, during his talk show. Mr. Limbaugh’s text
was also made publicly available6. Mr. Limbaugh’s word count
was 756 words, containing six special punctuation instances,
five “?” and one “!” along with an adverb-to-text ratio of 1:126.
Additionally, Mr. Limbaugh’s text invokes rhetorical devices
discussed earlier such as plain folk talk. Thus, based on these
few characteristics, Limbaugh’s words would deviate farther from
ground truth than would Fauci’s. This is not to say that Dr.
Fauci’s remarks are considered ground truth, but that Dr. Fauci’s
5http://cbsnews.com/
6http://mediamatters.org/
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words are measurably more trustworthy than Mr. Limbaugh’s.
Limbaugh’s text would suggest more than one standard deviation
off of ground truth, and Fauci’s remarks would be considered less
than one-half standard deviation from ground truth.
This brings us to the pattern spread. The OSoMe tool7
allows for rapid tracking and visualization of hashtags and other
social media features. When the Fauci and Limbaugh hashtags
are compared in Figure 1, Limbaugh outperforms Fauci. Rush
Limbaugh had been awarded the medal of Freedom in early
7http://osome.iuni.iu.edu/
February (notice the peak in the Limbaugh hashtag, followed by a
drop that remains higher than Fauci’s even when Fauci’s interview
is aired. Even more interesting is the delta between Limbaugh
and Fauci on February 16, the date that the Fauci interview
aired. The pattern spread appears to show the fact-based narrative
underperforming. Only in March, once the pandemic had taken
hold did Fauci surpass Limbaugh. Limbaugh had a full month
(possibly longer) to deliver his version of the message to a
larger audience.
This same phenomenon can be observed again with the
face mask debate where “#nomask” drowns out “stopthespread,”
FIGURE 1 | Trending data Limbaugh and Fauci mid-February.
FIGURE 2 | Hashtags from the mask debate.
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illustrated in Figure 2. Then more recently, this pattern
is observed again with the “#movetheeletion” hashtag when
compared to the real news of the sharp decline in GDP in the
United States, as seen in Figure 3. The underperforming hashtags
typically distribute longer, and the peaks tend to be shorter than
their counterparts associated with fake narratives. Thus, the fake
hashtags would result in the deviation value increasing. In the
case of the #nomask hashtag, this pattern of a steep, dramatic
peak with small tails was observed with election data in 2016
(Sample et al., 2018).
False or misleading narratives are also used to distract from
factual news stories. This example was recently observed when
President Trump suggested delaying the November election as
the GDP quarterly data were released. In this case, the large
drop in the US GDP would normally be the leading news as this
drop would be associated with a significant economic recession.
However, Figure 3 illustrates the Twitter feed of tweets for
delaying the election that drowns out the GDP data tweets on
July 30–31, 2020.
Pattern spread data can be valued by measurement off of
known good news stories pattern spread.
The final model point of reputation analysis can be thought of
as a consideration of the source. In the Fauci–Limbaugh example,
the source of the Fauci interview is widely considered reputable.
In this very simple example, Dr. Fauci has a history of speaking
accurately, particularly when discussing medical matters; thus,
his overall accuracy value would be considerably better than
that of Mr. Limbaugh. This reputation analysis could be further
enhanced by examining the sources that picked up both speeches
for publication and those sources could also be evaluated. A final
scoring metric could come from fact checking organization,
where a point is also given for debunking a story narrative. The
overall analysis when the three-point model is applied is that
the closer to zero the total score (linguistic, pattern spread, and
reputation values) lands, the more factually accurate the story.
SUMMARY
Szfranski (1997) argued that information warfare attacks would
be enacted against both information systems and belief systems
and that leaders and their supporting non-combatants would
both be targeted. This is currently the case with fake news.
Szfranski (1997) thought that open societies, such as Western
democracies, would have better defenses than their autocratic
counterparts, but the results on this front are decidedly mixed.
The current iteration of fake news or propaganda operates in
a jujitsu fashion, where a target’s strengths are used against
itself, something that was unanticipated with the rise of
digital propaganda.
There are many different reasons for the widespread success
of this iteration. Key factors include the refined targeting
techniques, the breadth of the Internet reach, the trust of social
media platforms, the financial incentives for data management
companies to sell information, and the use of open values
systems found in open societies against those societies. Some
open societies (i.e., Finland, Estonia, Latvia) have demonstrated
resilience to fake news (Atkinson, 2018), suggesting a possible
common set of values that have not been investigated. However,
implementing defenses or countering tactics at speed requires
an interdisciplinary approach. Meeting this challenge requires
deep interactions that reflect a true exchange of ideas and
FIGURE 3 | Twitter feeds for GDP drop and delay the election.
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implementation of models outside the traditional disciplines that
support a fused response to this new generation of espionage
(Younger, 2018).
Interdisciplinary work can help provide a more unified
front to a currently fragmented, open-ended institution
(Waisbord, 2018). Cybersecurity can aid in explaining
how social bots spread misinformation; this can help
journalists understand how misinformation spreads online
and address increasing frustrations controlling fake news
propagation (Schapals, 2018). Psychology sheds light on
the phenomena of fake news amplification by means of
echo chambers and confirmation bias to provide more
conscious perspectives of how news, whether fake or not, is
consumed in different cultures and groups. Akin to other
areas, for journalism to adapt to change cultivated by the
internet, a discussion should be initiated that recognizes the
integration of multidimensional solutions. Journalists not
only are responsible for the integrity and truth of their own
reports, but also recognize that existing understanding of
fake news spread is foggy (Mhamdi, 2016). Interdisciplinary
approaches should acquit journalists from being solely
responsible for policing fake news in today’s contemporary
digital environment and emphasize collaboration to account
for other trends responsible for fake news proliferation in our
information streams.
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